During the past year, several law schools have held conferences to commemorate the bicentennial of the Supreme Court's 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison.
1
The prevalence of these conunemorations is not surprising. Marbury is widely regarded today as the most important case in American constitutional history. 7. 109 U. S. 3 (1883) . The Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases outraged blacks throughout the nation, particularly in the North. The decision prompted the establishment of new civil rights organizations across the North (including two hundred in Ohio alone), and led to the enactment of anti-striking down important congressional legislation.
Indeed, a perusal of the Court's use of Marbury during the nineteenth century suggests that the decision had far greater importance for its discussion of writs of mandamus or the Court's original jurisdiction than for its discussion of judicial review. Similarly, an examination of nineteenth-century constitutional law treatises suggests that most legal scholars did not regard Marbury as a seminal decision establishing the principle of judicial review. In fact, nineteenthcentury treatises were more likely to cite Marbury as authority on questions pertaining to writs of mandamus, executive power, or the Court's original jurisdiction, than for the principle of judicial • 8 reVIew.
But during the late nineteenth century, the issue of judicial review became ensnared with the highly contentious public debate over state regulation of private economic affairs-particularly regulation designed to ameliorate the effects of industrialization, corral the power of concentrated wealth, and protect the interests of labor. Many conservative legal scholars, jurists, and politicians urged the courts to exercise judicial review more aggressively in order to curb reform efforts that interfered with private property and contract rights. Many reformers, on the other hand, attacked the courts for thwarting the will of the people through judicial review and establishing a "judicial oligarchy."
Proponents of judicial review during the late nineteenth century seized upon the Marbury decision and its author, Chief Justice John Marshall, to legitimize their claims for an expansive conception of the doctrine-particularly after the Court engaged in an extraordinarily controversial exercise of judicial review in 1895, declaring the newly enacted federal income tax unconstitutional. 9 In the struggle to defend the Court's actions, judicial review enthusiasts elevated the Marbury decision-and Chief Justice John Marshall-to icon status to fend off attacks that the Court had acted in an unwarranted fashion. In the process, Marbury became, for the first time, a "great case"-as measured by its treatment in judicial opinions, legal treatises, and casebooks-a moniker that would have discrimination legislation in eleven northern and western states within two years. Davison M. Douglas, Contract Rights and Civil Rights, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1541 REV. , 1555 REV. (2002 ; Valeria W. Weaver, The Failure of Civil Rights 1875-1883 and Its Repercussions, 54 J . NEGRO HIST. 368, 373-75 (1969 been ill applied to the decision for most of the nineteenth century.
During the twentieth century, particularly after the onset of the Warren Court, the exercise of judicial review has remained controversial. Once again, Marbury has been deployed in the debate over judicial review. During the past half century, justices on the Court in high-profile exercises of judicial review of both legislation and executive action have increasingly called upon Marbury to justifY their actions, far more frequently than at any time in the Court's history. For both conservative and liberal justices, Marbury has become an important rhetorical tool in the ongoing debate about the Court's proper role in American constitutional government. But the justices have used Marbury not only to defend judicial review in controversial cases. They have also embraced Marbury for other instrumental purposes-in particular, to make the Court's interpretations of constitutional text preeminent over those of other governmental actors, a move that constituted an extension of Marbury itself.
Today, Marbury u. Madison is regarded as the central decision in the canon of American constitutional law. But its greatness rests not on its intrinsic qualities as a legal decision nor on its historical significance in 1803. Rather, Marbury enjoys greatness because the doctrine with which it is so intimately associated-judicial reviewhas become such a significant feature of our constitutional structure.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW PRIOR TO MARBURY
Although many lawyers and law students view Marbury as establishing the principle of judicial review, in fact, judicial review enjoyed considerable support prior to John Marshall's 1803 decision.
10 Even prior to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a few state courts had either exercised judicial review or conceded the legitimacy of the principle, 11 though this early use of judicial review 10. For a recent and persuasive summary of the evidence for the acceptance of judicial review prior to Marbury, see Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great" Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111 REV. , 1113 REV. -17 (2001 12 At the 1787 Convention and the state ratifying debates, the framers discussed judicial review, with supporters of the concept outnumbering opponents.
13
During the 1790s, the use of judicial review became more common. Some state courts, particularly in Virginia, continued to strike down statutes under state constitutions.
14 Moreover, a few bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and, pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no further"). REV. 491 (1994) . 12. For example, when a New York Mayor's Court in 1784 suggested in dicta the principle of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, see supra note 11, the decision provoked a sharp rebuke from the New York General Assembly which attacked the decision as "subversive of good order and the sovereignty of the state," and leading "directly to anarchy and confusion." HAINES, supra note 11, at 101-03; L.B. Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 26 POL. SCI. Q. 238, 245-46 (1911) . In Rhode Island, after the justices of the Superior Court rendered a decision perceived as holding a state statute unconstitutional, see supra note 11, the General Assembly directed the justices in question to appear before the Assembly to explain their decision; in the next election, all but one of the justices were defeated. HAINES, supra note 11, Boudin, supra, 13. Klarman, supra note 10, at 1114. Among the supporters were Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who noted that "[i]n some States, the Judges had actually set aside laws as being against the Constitution. This was done too with general approbation." WARREN, supra note 11, at 50. Luther Martin suggested that " [a] s to the constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the Judges in their proper official character." Id. Charles Warren counted twenty-two other members of the Constitutional Convention as expressing support for judicial review either contemporaneous with the Convention or within a few years thereafter. see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills ed., 1982) (asserting the duty of the courts "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void"). By the same token, Warren reports that only four members of the Convention were clear opponents to judicial review. WARREN, supra note 11, at 51.
14. See, e.g., Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 No question can be made with us, but that the acts of the legislative body, contrary to the true intent and meaning of the Constitution, ought to be absolutely null and void. The only inquiry which can arise in the subject is, whether the legislature is not of itself the competent judge of its own constitutional limits . . . or whether the business of determining ... is not rather the fit and exclusive province of the courts of justice .... The courts of justice which are organized with peculiar advantages to exempt them from the baneful influence of faction ... are ... the most proper power in the government to keep the legislature within the limits of its duty, and to maintain the authority of the Constitution. James Kent, Kent's Introductory Lecture, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 335-36 (1903) . the courts to assess the constitutionality of legislation was not controversial. Indeed, critics of the decision, including Thomas Jefferson, directed their ire not at the decision's exercise of judicial review, 23 but rather at the separation of powers implications of the suggestion that the Court might issue a writ of mandamus to a Cabinet official. That the discussion of judicial review in Marbury would someday cause the decision to be considered "the most famous case in our history'' 24 could not have been predicted in 1803.
II. MARBURY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY Not surprisingly, Marbury was not considered a "great case" during most of the nineteenth century, a time of limited judicial review by the Supreme Court. The notion of judicial review of congressional statutes was not controversial during the Marshall or Taney courts, in significant measure because of its sparing use. 25 As Daniel Farber notes in his contribution to this Symposium, the Supreme Court's decisions demarking the relationship between the Court and the states proved far more controversial during the antebellum era than did Marbury's assertion of the right of the Court to assess the constitutionality of a congressional statute. 26 Moreover, prior to the Civil War, the Court received more criticism for the deference it showed Congress in cases such as McCulloch v. Maryland, '2:7 he did discuss many other cases involving exercises of judicial review. 39 Moreover, in his 1880 The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America, essentially a student constitutional law hornbook, Cooley also downplayed Marbury's relevance to judicial review, citing the case only in connection with discussions of the authority of executive officers, presidential commissions, the Court's original jurisdiction, and the ability of judicial process to reach the President.
4°
Cooley did discuss judicial review in this hornbook, claiming that "the judiciary is the final authority in the construction of the Constitution and the laws, and its construction should be received and followed by the other departments," but did not cite Marbury as authority for that proposition.
41
Other treatises published during the second half of the nineteenth century also ignored the Marbury decision in their discussion of judicial review. John Norton Pomeroy, dean of the law school at New York University, in his 1868 treatise An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States, cited Marbury only in connection with writs of mandamus and the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, not in connection with judicial review.
42
To support his claim that "the national Judiciary is the final arbiter as to the meaning of the Constitution," and possesses the power to assess "the validity of a statute of Congress or of a state legislature," Pomeroy cited four Supreme Court decisions, but not Marbury.
43
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller, who served on the Court from 1862 until his death in 1890, described Marbury in an 1889 lecture as a "very lengthy, and an exhaustive discussion of the power of a court of law to compel officers by the writ of mandamus to discharge duties which it is clear they are bound to perform, and in regard to which they have no discretion." 44 Justice Miller, whose 39. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 38, at 159-88. Cooley, in another section of his treatise, did cite Marbury on one occasion-as one of the "very numerous authorities upon the subject" of the "right and the power of the courts" to assess the constitutionality of legislative The immense importance of this decision [Marbury] ... may be appreciated when it is understood that the principles declared . . . subjected the ministerial and executive officers of the Government, all over the country, to the control of the courts, in regard to the execution of a large part of their duties. Its application to the very highest officers of the Government, except perhaps the President himself, has been illustrated in numerous cases in the courts of the United States . ...
45
But Justice Miller made no mention of the Marbury decision's discussion of judicial review of legislation in his constitutional law lectures.
As that "courts of justice ... have, since the earliest days of our republic, steadily and vigorously applied" the doctrine of judicial review, and indicated that the "doctrine may be considered as having been finally settled in Marbury us. LAW 216 (1857) . In the context of discussing various exercises of judicial review in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Sedgewick also notes that the "principle [of judicial review was] deliberately and definitively settled" in [Vol. 38 In part, the dearth of references to Marbury in both judicial opinions and constitutional law treatises reflected the fact that for much of the nineteenth century, the issue of judicial review itself was far less controversial than the issue of what its proper scope should be. 47 Many treatises of the post-Civil War era, for example, spent considerably more space discussing the question whether courts should strike down statutes that offended notions of "natural justice" as opposed to a specific constitutional provision, 48 than they did discussing the principle of judicial review itself.
Madison." THEODORE SEDGEWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL

III. MARBURYDURINGTHE POPULIST AND PROGRESSIVE ERAS
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the issue of judicial review became far more controversial, as courts began to exercise judicial review far more frequently than ever before. This expanded use of judicial review, in response to an array of legislative reform efforts designed to ameliorate the effects of rapid industrialization and to protect the interests of workers, provoked intense controversy. Proponents of judicial review utilized Marbury to defend their position. After ninety years of relative insignificance as a decision associated with judicial review, Marbury /d. at 210 n.l. Ordronaux, however, offered a limited characterization of the doctrine of judicial review. Citing Marbury along with several cases and treatises, he claimed that "the decisions of even our highest courts are accepted as a finality only in relation to the particular cases with which they happen to deal, and their judgments do not impose compulsory limitations upon the action of any other department." /d. at 420.
47. NELSON, supra note 30, at 86-87 (noting that by the middle of the nineteenth century, "judicial review had become an accepted feature of American law . . . . With the doctrine firmly established, judges began to exercise their power of review with greater frequency, and ... in a fashion that involved them in substantial controversy.").
48. For example, both Thomas Cooley and Christopher Tiedeman in their treatises engaged in lengthy discussions of the question whether, in Tiedeman's words, courts could "declare an act of the legislature void, because it violates some abstract rule of justice, when there is no constitutional prohibition." TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER, supra note 46, at 5-13; see also COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 38, at 164-70. became an important precedent for courts and commentators seeking to justify the exercise of judicial review. In the process, Marbury became, for many, one of the "great cases" of American constitutional law.
During the 1880s and early 1890s, a number of jurists and legal scholars expressed alarm at the growth in state and federal legislation regulating eccnomic affairs. University of Missouri law professor Christopher Tiedeman, for example, in his influential1886 treatise Limitations of Police Power in the United States, wrote with great passion about the dangers oflegislative excess:
Socialism, Communism, and Anarchism are rampant throughout the civilized world. The State is called on to protect the weak against the shrewdness of the stronger, to determine what wages a workman shall receive for his labor, and how many hours daily he shall labor .... The demands of Socialists and Communists vary in degree and in detail, and the most extreme of them insist upon the assumption by government of the paternal character altogether ....
Contemplating these extraordinary demands of the great army of discontents, and their apparent power, with the growth and development of universal suffrage, to enforce their views of civil polity upon the civilized world, the conservative classes stand in constant fear of the advent of an absolutism more tyrannical and more unreasoning than any before experienced by man, the absolutism of a democratic majority. 50. 143 U.S. 517, 549-52 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 51. Id. at 551. Other late nineteenth-century lawyers also expressed concern about the excesses of legislatures. Former U.S. Senator Waitman Willey of West Virginia addressed his state's bar association in 1887 and spoke of the need for lawyers to impose "a wholesome check upon those tendencies to licentiousness and disorder incident to popular institutions." ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887 -1895 , at 21 (1960 . Similarly, Georgia attorney I.E. Shumate, in an 1887
Both Tiedeman and Brewer called on courts to enforce both constitutional and "natural rights" norms against legislative excess.
52
In an 1887 lecture subsequently published in his 1890 book, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States, Tiedeman articulated an expansive vision of "natural rights" which courts must enforce against legislative encroachment:
Under the stress of economical relations, the clashing of private interests, the conflicts of labor and capital, the old superstition that government has the power to banish evil from the earth . . . has been revived; and all these so-called natural rights, which the framers of our constitutions declared to be inalienable, and the violation of which they pronounced to be a just cause for rebellion, are in imminent danger of serious infringement ....
In these days of great social unrest, we applaud the disposition of the courts to seize hold of these general declaration of rights as an authority for them to lay their interdict upon all legislative acts which interfere with the individual's natural rights, even though these acts do not violate any specific or special provision of the Constitution ....
53
address to his state's bar association, worried about the increase in legislative regulation of private affairs which he feared was "affecting the conduct of almost every branch of business and controlling the private conduct of men in all relations of life." !d. Similarly, in 1893, in a speech to the New York State Bar Association, Justice Brewer offered a robust defense of the role of courts in the protection of individual liberty through judicial review. Like Tiedeman, Brewer urged the courts to protect economic liberty not just under the Constitution but also with reference to principles of natural law:
The courts ... make no laws, they establish no policy, they never enter into the domain of popular action. During the early 1890s, Populists urged a graduated income tax to meet the federal budget deficit.
59
Although the tax enacted in August 1894 provided for only a two percent tax rate on incomes above $4000, it provoked a vituperous response from opponents who dismissed it as "class legislation" and ''war upon honest industry." 60 United States Senator David Hill of New York described the tax as the work of "anarchists, communists, and socialists."
61 John Forrest Dillon, a Wall Street lawyer, former state and federal judge, and enthusiastic proponent of laissez faire, 62 characterized the tax as "class legislation of the most pronounced and vicious type" and argued that it was ''violative of the constitutional rights of the property owner, subversive of the existing social polity, and essentially revolutionary. ,,ro
Efforts were immediately launched to challenge the constitutionality of the new income tax in court on the grounds that it was a "direct tax" required under Article I of the Constitution to be apportioned among the states based on population. Within months, a legal challenge to the tax supported by several of the ACTION (1892) , which favored limits on judicial power, arguing that judicial review "dethrones the people who should be Sovereign and enthrones an oligarchy").
57 I have thought that one of the fundamental objects of all civilized government was the preservation of the rights of private property. I have thought that it was the very keystone of the arch upon which all civilized government rests, and that this once abandoned, everything was . . . in danger . . . . According to the doctrines that have been propounded here this morning, even that great fundamental principle has been scattered to the winds.
65
"I do not believe that any member of this court ever has sat or ever will sit to hear and decide a case the consequences of which will be so far-reaching as this," Choate claimed at the conclusion of his oral argument, "not even the venerable member [Justice Stephen Field] [l]f it be true that a mighty army of sixty million citizens is likely to be incensed by this decision, it is the more vital to the future welfare of this country that this court again resolutely and courageously declare, as Marshall did, that it has the power to set aside an act of Congress violative of the Constitution, and that it will not hesitate in executing that power, no matter what the threatened consequences of popular or populistic wrath may be.
69
The income tax appeared to be a constitutional exercise of congressional power. In fact, the Court had previously-and without dissent-sustained the use of an income tax promulgated during the Civil War against an argument that it was a direct tax. Nothing could be more unwise and dangerous-nothing more foreign to the spirit of the Constitution-than an attempt to baffle and defeat a popular determination by a judgment in a lawsuit. When the opposing forces of sixty millions of people have become arrayed in hostile political ranks upon a question which all men feel is not a question of law, but of legislation, the only path of safety is to accept the voice of the majority as final. Id. at 531-32 (argument of James C. Carter).
70. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) ("Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the [income] tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty."); see also Francis R. Jones, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 9 HARV. L. REV. 198, 198 (1895) (concluding that the Court in Pollock "deliver [ed] an opinion in which is laid down a doctrine that is contrary to what has been accepted as law for nearly one hundred years"). For an excellent discussion of the Civil War income tax and the Court's consideration of the constitutionality of that tax in Springer, see ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861 TAX, -1913 TAX, , at 15-99 (1993 . constitutionality of taxing income derived from real property and the second in which the Court considered the constitutionality of taxing income derived from personal property-the Court struck down the income tax statute as an unconstitutional direct tax. The conservative majority on the Court clearly viewed any type of income tax as an attack on propertied interests. In his concurrence, Justice Field thundered: "The present assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the stepping-stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of the poor against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness."
71 Justice John Marshall Harlan later commented that Justice Field had "acted often like a mad man during the whole of this contest about the income tax."
72
The Pollock dissenters were particularly vitriolic in their characterization of the majority's actions. Justice Howell Jackson, who had traveled from his Tennessee sickbed to hear reargument on the personal property issue, labeled the Court's decision "the most disastrous blow ever struck at the constitutional power of Congress."
73 (Jackson's dissent would be his last opinion; he would be dead within three months.
74
) Justice Henry Brown characterized the Court's decision as "nothing less than a surrender of the taxing power to the moneyed class ... fraught with immeasurable danger to the future of the country," and a decision that "approaches the proportions of a national calamity .... "
75 "It is certainly a strange commentary upon the Constitution of the United States and upon a democratic government," Brown charged, "that Congress has no power to lay a tax which is one of the main sources of revenue of nearly every civilized State . . . . I hope it may not prove the first step toward the submergence of the liberties of the people in a sordid despotism of wealth. 
It is never a light thing to set aside the deliberate will of the legislature, and in my opinion it should never be done, except upon the clearest proof of its conflict with fundamental law. Respect for the Constitution will not be inspired by a narrow and technical construction which shall limit or impair the necessary powers of Congress.
with his fist while delivering his dissent, 77 called the decision "a disaster to the country,"
78 and predicted in a letter to his sons a few weeks later that the decision ''will become as hateful with the American people as the Dred Scott case was when it was decided . . . . The recent decision will have the effect, if the country recognizes it permanently as good law, to make the freemen of America the slaves of accumulated wealth."
79 Justice Edward White rebuked his colleagues in the majority for ignoring clear precedent:
The conservation and orderly development of our institutions rests on our acceptance of the results of the past, and their use as lights to guide our steps in the future. Teach the lesson that settled principles may be overthrown at any time, and confusion and turmoil must ultimately result . . . . If the permanency of [the Court's) conclusions is to depend upon the personal opinions of those who, from time to time, may make up its membership, it will inevitably become a theatre of political strife, and its action will be without coherence or Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution; or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty." And the Chief Justice added that the doctrine "that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law," "would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions." 84 
395
Fuller's use of the Marbury decision to justify the Court's action was unprecedented. Never before in its history had the Court deployed the Marbury decision to justify an exercise of judicial review. Moreover, during the ninety-two years between Marbury and Pollock, the Court had never once seen it necessary when declaring a congressional statute unconstitutional to defend its power to exercise judicial review by reference to the authority of an earlier decision. In all prior cases, the Court merely asserted its power to declare a congressional statute unconstitutional without specifically citing case authority supporting that course of action.
85
The Court's inaugural use of the Marbury decision to defend an exercise of judicial review was saved for an extraordinarily controversial decision in which the Court's judgment was highly vulnerable to criticism. The Court thus began a pattern that would continue in the twentieth century of citing Marbury and quoting Chief Justice Marshall when the stakes were particularly high. 86 The Pollock decisions were clearly among the most controversial decisions of the late nineteenth century, 87 far more controversial than Plessy v. Ferguson 88 the following term.
89
The decisions provoked a strong "anti-Court" sentiment across the nation. As historian Michael Kammen has noted, after 1895 "the Court ceased to be sacred" in the minds of many Americans: " [o] nly in the wake of Dred Scott had politicization of the Court been more severe, and polarization over constitutional issues more sharp." 90 William Howard Taft later commented that "[n]othing has ever injured the prestige of the Supreme Court more" than the Pollock decisions.
91
For only the third time in the Court's history, popular reaction led to a constitutional amendment reversing a Court decision. 92 Idaho Senator William Borah predicted that if the proposed income tax amendment failed, "the greatest war in history will be fought 87. In 1895, the Court issued two other decisions that also provoked a public outcry: United States u. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), in which the Court narrowly construed the Sherman Act to uphold the lawfulness of the Sugar Trust, and In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), in which the Court upheld the use of a labor injunction against labor leader Eugene Debs. These two decisions, along with Pollock, caused many, in the words of one scholar, to view the Court not as "a tribunal of justice, whose members sought their guidance from the Constitution, the wisdom of the past, and the public conscience, but instead a body of appointed men seeking to protect propertied interests by rejecting the past and rigging the future." JOHN E . SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890 SOCIETY, -1920 SOCIETY, , at 74 (1978 96. KERMIT L. HALL, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 31 (1985) . Historian Carl Degler has noted of the 1896 election: "The class consciousness and even class hatred that ran through the speeches and literature of the presidential campaign of 1896 came close to making Justice Field a prophet" for his prediction in his Pollock concurrence of a "war of the poor against the rich." CARL DEGLER, THE AGE OF THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 1876 REVOLUTION -1900 REVOLUTION , at 124 (1967 Duty and Power, 30 AM. L. REV. 357, 362 (1896) (arguing that "(i]n times of political upheaval, of sectional animosity, of Communistic uprising, the nine quiet men who spend their lives away from the political field, free from the necessity of demagoguery, constitute ... the very sheet-anchor of the institutions of our land").
101. Marshall Day celebrations, heavily promoted by the conservative American Bar Association, were held in February 1901 in thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia; ceremonies in the U.S. Capitol building were attended by members of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the diplomatic corps. KAMMEN, supra note 90, at 209-10; 2 LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 3, at 124.
102. The vote in the first Pollock decision striking down the taxation of income derived from real property had been six to two, but the Court had divided four to four on the question of income derived from personal property and so scheduled reargument. The tally of how each justice voted on the personal property issue was not !lisclosed. Justice Jackson, absent from the deliberations and vote in the first decision, was present for the reargument and voted to sustain the tax as it pertained to income derived from personal property. Given that four justices had voted earlier to sustain the tax with respect to income from personal property, Jackson's vote appeared to provide a fifth vote to sustain the tax. But the second Pollock decision declared the tax on so as to establish "a consensus of opinion concerning Marshall on the part of eminent lawyers in all parts of the country." 103 Dillon's threevolume set of speeches from Marshall Day celebrations provides a fascinating snapshot of the emergence of both Marbury and Marshall as important reference points in the defense of judicial review, as well as the coming of age of Marbury as a "great case."
The This rhetorical connection between Marbury and the protection of liberty was deployed by other speakers as well. Georgia attorney income derived from personal property unconstitutional on a five to four vote. Thus, one justice, whose identity was unknown, changed his vote between the first and second decisions. The culprit was widely believed to be Justice Shiras. As historian Arnold Paul notes, "Shiras was soon subjected to an outpouring of violent obloquy by the supporters of the income tax, furious that one man's vacillation should have wrecked the whole tax." PAUL, supra note 51, at 214. Historians have subsequently questioned whether in fact Shiras was the guilty party. Among the speeches celebrating Marshall's appointment in Dillon's volumes was a lengthy one by a New York lawyer, Bourke Cockran.
After lauding Marshall's decision in Marbury for establishing "the most extraordinary feature of our political system," Cockran made the unsupportable claim that "[n)ever has the Supreme Court exercised its supreme power of setting aside a law of Congress or of a State that the people did not sustain its course with substantial unanimity," 107 ignoring the fact that several of the Court's recent exercises of judicial review, as in Pollock, had provoked strong opposition. 108 Cockran went on to belittle legislative bodies: "the close of the nineteenth century witnessed a decline in the popularity of those parliamentary institutions which, at its beginning, were universally believed to be the sure panacea for all social or economic ills."
109
In contrast, Cockran extolled the judiciary, describing it as the one branch of government "untainted by any breath of suspicion, to which the people are so passionately attached that the slightest attempt to disturb its independence or even to review its decisions at the ballot box would be the ruin of the political party suggesting it. "
110 Though the legislative branch may create conditions in which "industry languishes, prosperity withers, civilization itself is imperiled," the people are safe, Cockran argued, because of the courts and their willingness to embrace principles of judicial review developed by Marshall in Marbury: ''while the courts remain true to the example and precepts of Marshall, all the essential rights of the citizen are as secure as the earth under his feet-they can no more be invaded than the stars in heaven can be blotted from his gaze."m One cannot read these three volumes of tributes to Marshall without being struck by the fact that a significant portion of the elite American bar in 1901 now recognized the Marbury decision as central to their defense of judicial review. Indeed, those eager to roll back the tide of legislative excess deployed Marbury with considerable rhetorical force. In the process, the profile of the Marbury decision in the American legal consciousness soared; by the early twentieth century, the decision ''had gained almost religious acceptance" among conservative lawyers "because it said just what they wanted to hear."
112 Not surprisingly, some of the speakers at the 1901 commemoration of Marshall's appointment suggested that there be "another centennial in 1903 to celebrate Marbury v. Madison properly."
113
By the same token, the conservative bar sought to enhance John Marshall's stature and to use that stature (along with his authorship of Marbury) in the defense of judicial review.
114 Marshall certainly enjoyed prominence throughout the nineteenth century, 115 111. 1 id. at 418. Cockran elaborated:
Has not the general welfare been promoted beyond the wildest hopes of the fathers since the security of property encourages industry to wring measureless abundance from a fruitful soil? Are not the blessings of liberty . . . beyond fear of invasion or danger of abridgement by the effective protection which the judiciary casts over the essential rights of every citizen? 1 id. at 419.
112. DONALD 0. DEWEY, MARSHALL VERSUS JEFFERSON: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF MARBURYV. MADISON 183 (1970) .
113. Id. at 184. The conservative bar, in particular the American Bar Association, also launched a "campaign of education" during the first decade of the twentieth century whereby they attempted to "convince the public that judges merely declare the law and have no part in the making of it." TWISS, supra note 38, at 146. These efforts were meant to counteract the criticism of Progressive critics of judicial activism. I d. at 146-4 7.
114. As Donald Dewey has noted, the "various celebrations in 1901 of the centennial of John Marshall's appointment worshiped John Marshall and judicial review as one." DEWEY, supra note 112, at 184.
115. As Michael Kammen has noted, "Marshall's prestige remained high" during the nineteenth century, but "[e]ven so, he was not a cynosure of attention during the half century following his death in 1835." KAMMEN, supra note 90, at 209. Although a statue of Marshall was completed and presented to the United States Supreme Court for display in 1884 and a Marshall biography appeared in 1885, Marshall would not gain the lofty status that he enjoys today but as Kent Newmyer has noted, "Marshall's incorporation into the conservative constitutional construct of the late nineteenth century helped consolidate his mythic status."
116
In the early years of the twentieth century, Marshall's home in Richmond was saved from destruction and given to the Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiquities which opened the home to the public in 1913 as "a shrine of American constitutionalism."
117 In his 1908 classic study Constitutional Government, Woodrow Wilson called Marshall " [b] y corrunon consent the most notable and one of the most statesmanlike figures in our whole judicial history . . . . "
118
Marshall enjoyed considerably more attention from biographers during the early twentieth century than he had during the nineteenth century; in fact, with the publication of Albert Beveridge's magisterial fourvolume biography of Marshall during the second decade of the twentieth century, the hagiography of the great Chief Justice was complete. In my opinion Marshall's great place in the history of our country is due, not to any doctrine of the limitations of the legislative power, which others deduced from that decision more than half a century later and with but doubtful warrant, but to the liberal spirit in which he interpreted, and thus helped to develop, the legislative powers of Congress. Boudin, supra note 12, at 256. Madison to the present day, no utterance of this court has intimated a doubt that ... the national government is a government of enumerated powers, the exercise of which is restricted to the use of means appropriate .. . to constitutional ends." 12 s Two years later, when the Court declined in a narrow vote to hold unconstitutional a federal statute prohibiting the movement of lottery tickets between states, Chief Justice Fuller, writing for four dissenting justices, relied on Marbury to support the argument that the Court should declare the statute in question unconstitutional.
126 During the eight years since Pollock, the Court's activist justices had helped solidify the connection between Marbury and judicial review.
Thereafter, the Court would reaffirm this connection. In a 1911
120. Justice Gray, for example, gave considerable emphasis to Marbury , which he described as " [o] COURTS 28-31 (1913 COURTS 28-31 ( , 1926 .
139. JAMES PARKER HALL, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8-11 (1914 S. 528 (1985) , an important Tenth Amendment decision, Justice Lewis Powell dissented, arguing that the deference given by the majority to Congress constituted a rejection of "the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from federal overreaching" and disregard for "the teaching of the most famous case in our history." Id. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (in dissenting from a decision that Congress did not exceed its constitutional power in enacting the Voting Rights Act, Rehnquist argued that "[w)hile the presumption of constitutionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of the Federal Government or of one of the States, it is this Court which is ultimately responsible for deciding challenges to the exercise of power by those entities. 161 the Court confronted the extraordinarily high-stakes task of assessing a claim of executive privilege by the President of the United States in a case that cut to the heart of the Nixon presidency. The Court noted that the President interpreted the Constitution as granting him an absolute privilege of confidentiality in all presidential communications and conceded that such an interpretation was entitled to great respect: "In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others." 162 Choosing to reject that broad construction of presidential privilege, the Court turned to Marbury for support: "Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison that '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."' 163 Upon reviewing prior cases in which the Court had held that federal courts must "on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch," 164 the Court proceeded to "reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court 'to say what the law is' with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. 168 In dissent, then Justice Rehnquist complained of the Court's abandonment of precedent and in particular, Justice Lewis Powell's suggestion in a concurring opinion that Monroe was owed less deference because the question of municipal liability "was never actually briefed or argued in this Court" and resolution of that issue was not "necessary to resolve the contentions made in that case."
169 "Private parties must be able to rely upon explicitly stated holdings of this Court," Rehnquist chided his colleagues, ''without being obliged to peruse the briefs of the litigants to predict the likelihood that this Court might change its mind." 170 To bolster his argument, Rehnquist cleverly suggested that the Court's decision and Powell's rationale left the venerable Marbury decision vulnerable to reversal:
To cast such doubt upon each of our cases, from Marbury v. Madison forward, in which the explicit ground of decision "was never actually briefed or argued," (Powell, J., concurring), would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the law. Indeed, in Marbury itself, the argument of Charles Lee on behalf of the applicants . . . devotes not a word to the question of whether this Court has the power to invalidate a statute duly enacted by the Congress. 171 Finally, Chief Justice Marshall's language in Marbury that " [t] he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury" 172 has been used by various justices to justifY the establishment of private rights of action under constitutional provisions 173 or to criticize the Court for refusing to provide a remedy for a constitutional violation where no specific remedy has been provided by a coordinate branch of government. Madison, it is equally-and emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. ld. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978) (citation omitted)).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 978 & n.36 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized by officers relying on a warrant that is subsequently determined to be defective; arguing that the Court should not "concede the existence of a constitutional violation for which there is no remedy," and quoting Marbury to the effect that "[t)he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury"); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 359 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that even if a judge engaged in unconstitutional racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman, dismissal of indictment is unwarranted; accuses the Court of refusing to apply the "elementary, though oft-ignored, principle that every right must be vindicated by an effective remedy" (citing Marbury)); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 368 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that police officers have absolute immunity from damages for perjured testimony at a criminal trial, quoting Marbury to the effect that "[t)he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protections of the laws, whenever he receives an injury"); Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 656 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's holding that plaintiff has no cause of action for abuse of subpoena power by federal officer, citing Marbury v. Madison for "the settled principle of the accountability, in damages, of the individual governmental officer for the consequences of his wrongdoing").
V. CONCLUSION Marbury v.
Madison is now nndisputably one of "the great cases" of American constitutional law, nndeniably associated with the principle of judicial review.
175 But Marbury's greatness cannot be attributed to the pathbreaking character of the decision. Rather, Marbury has become great because, over the years, proponents of an expansive doctrine of judicial review have needed it to assume greatness.
175. As one historian of the Marbury decision has noted: "Right or not, flawed or not, Marbury u. Madison has become the symbol of American judicial review ... . How long (judicial review] will survive ... will depend on the use which judges of the future will make of the power for which Marbury u. Madison has been the rationalization and symboL" DEWEY, supra note 112, at 185-86.
